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SYMPOSIUM
DRONE WARS
Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?
Jens David Ohlin*
Abstract
It is a truism that new technologies are remaking the tactical and legal landscape of
armed conflict. While such statements are undoubtedly true, it is important to
separate genuine trends from scholarly exaggeration. The following essay, an
introduction to the DroneWars symposium of the Journal, catalogues today’s most
pressing disputes regarding international humanitarian law (IHL) and their conse-
quences for criminal responsibility. These include: (i) the triggering and classification
of armed conflicts with non-state actors; (ii) the relative scope of IHL and interna-
tional human rights law in asymmetrical conflicts; (iii) the targeting of suspected
terrorists under concept- or status-based classifications that render them subject to
lawful attack; (iv) the legal fate of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) drone operators
who participate in armed conflict without the orthodox privilege of combatancy con-
ferred on members of the armed forces; and (v) the principle of proportionality as it
applies to drone strikes that produce collateral damage. What emerges from this
survey is a portrait of drones as a technological development that has radically esca-
lated pre-existing tensions in IHL that first emerged with manned aerial attacks
and artillery. As conflicts with non-state actors proliferate and intensify, these
pre-existing tensions will continue to transform, via state practice, the reciprocity
usually associated with orthodox IHL.
1. Introduction
Reports abound that jus in bello is in crisis and that the putative armed conflict
between the United States and al-Qaeda is itself the casus belli of the legal
crisis.1 The protestations are loud, vociferous and panicky: targeted killings
* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; member, Editorial Committee of this Journal.
[jdo43@cornell.edu]
1 See M.E. O’Connell, ‘Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan,
2004^2009’, in S. Bronitt, M. Gani and S. Hufnagel (eds), Shooting to Kill: Socio-Legal
Perspectives on the Use of Lethal Force (Hart Publishing, 2012).
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against suspected terrorists have eroded respect for the principle of distinction;
drone strikes violate the principle of proportionality; targeting is now based
on status rather than conduct, violating deeply held principles of justice,
or the reverse, violating other principles of justice. While some of these
complaints may be based in reality, others are sometimes layered with exagger-
ations, either regarding the nature of the transgression or the clarity and uni-
versality of the original norm. If the use of drone technology against
non-state actors (NSAs) has made anything clear, it is this: there is far less
agreement regarding the application of core principles of international
humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL) than previously
thought, especially between nations that rely on aerial bombing and those
that are subject to its deadly technology. In fact, the disagreements regarding
the content and scope of core IHL principles predate the use of drones, and
have long preoccupied international tribunals.2 However, the drone programme
has thrown into stark relief a set of controversies that can now be catalogued,
addressed and possibly resolved (or at the very least, rendered explicit). The
task of this introduction is to catalogue and explain these core areas of dis-
agreement, liberating the individual authors of this symposium from doing so
and freeing them to engage with more specific issues in greater depth.
Most of the legal issues raised by the American drone campaign are, predict-
ably, alleged jus in bello violations, though a few issues sound in jus ad bellum.
For example, human rights critics and other commentators occasionally
complain that the asymmetrical nature of the lethal force of drones makes
the resort to force too easy.3 Since drones are remotely piloted, attacking
forces can neutralize their intended target and risk no loss of life when their
drones are deployed. The question becomes whether the asymmetrical nature
of the risk offends, on a conceptual level, the basic paradigm of co-equal belli-
gerents who meet each other on the battlefield and run the reciprocal risk of
killing and dying ç a paradigm encapsulated by the chivalric conception of
warfare, a conception already placed under pressure by the development, in
World War II, of aerial bombardment, but whose pressure has been inflated
into pure displacement now that pilots are remotely housed out of harm’s way.
The issue of aerial risk received widespread notice when the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) required its pilots to fly above 15,000 feet when
bombing Serbian targets during the conflict over Kosovo ç a decision that
allegedly prioritized force protection over civilian collateral damage. Indeed,
not a single pilot died during the conflict, and critics complained that NATO’s
obsession with zero casualties impermissibly prioritized the lives of soldiers
over the lives of civilians. That being said, there would be something odd
about a putative rule of international law that prevented an attacking force
2 See e.g. Judgment, Galic¤ (IT-98-29-T), Trial Chamber, 5 December 2003 (‘Galic¤ Trial Judgment’),
xx 41^61 (analysing distinction and proportionality); Judgment, D. Milosevic¤ (IT-98-29/1-T),
Trial Chamber, 12 December 2007, xx 877^882 (spreading terror through targeting civilians).
3 The complaint is critically examined in K. Anderson,‘Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Making
the Use of Force too Easy?’ in C. Finkelstein, J.D. Ohlin and A. Altman (eds), Targeted Killings:
Law and Morality in an AsymmetricalWorld (Oxford University Press, 2012) 374^399.
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from lowering the risk to its own personnel, as it does with drones, when low-
ering the risk to one’s own personnel does not increase the risk of collateral
damage to enemy civilians as it might have in Serbia.4
On a more practical level, the question is whether the asymmetrical use of
force, and the low risk of civilian casualties, will erode one of the automatic
enforcement mechanisms of the Article 2 prohibition on the use of force in
the United Nations (UN) Charter. In the past, the aggressive use of force
in contravention of the Charter was only possible when a country risked its
own personnel, thus providing a self-interested reason to comply with the
legal prohibition on the use of force, in addition to more principled reasons for
compliance. If aggressive force can be deployed without risk, will more nations
ignore the Charter (and customary law) prohibition on the use of force?
In this vein, it is perhaps sufficient to note that the problem is not new and
that nuclear weapons may also be used without risk. The solution to the nu-
clear dilemma was the deterrent rationale expressed in the Mutually Assured
Destruction Doctrine, which became a reality once nuclear weapons prolifer-
ated.5 The coming proliferation of drone technology may well result in a new
deterrence paradigm that provides an internal check on over-deployment of
drone technology.
Turning now to jus in bello problems raised by targeted killings, the issues
can be classified into five discrete categories: (i) the existence of a putative
armed conflict with al-Qaeda; (ii) the contentious relationship between IHL
and international human rights law (IHRL); (iii) whether targeted terrorists
are civilians or combatants; (iv) whether drone operators enjoy the privilege of
combatancy; and (v) the nature of proportionality calculations when civilians
are collateral victims. Each category will be addressed in order to express the
full landscape of legal dispute and evaluate whether jus in bello is truly in
crisis. The resulting portrait will reveal that most of these fissures pre-date the
development of drone technology and are simply emblematic of a pre-existing
disunity that consistently threatens the underlying reciprocity of IHL.
2. Triggering an Armed Conflict
The United States drone campaign is targeted almost exclusively at NSAs, such
as al-Qaeda or their regional affiliates, including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), al-Shabaab and possibly in the future Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). According to the official position as expressed by
government officials, the United States is waging an armed conflict against
4 Indeed, it appears plausible that the use of drones decrease the risk of enemy civilian casualties,
though the entire issue is the subject of intense factual dispute. See G.S. McNeal, ‘Are Targeted
Killings Unlawful? A Case Study in Empirical Claims without Empirical Evidence’, in
Finkelstein, Ohlin and Altman (eds), ibid., 326^346.
5 Compare T.C. Schelling,The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1960), at 78, with G.S.
Kavka, Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence (Cambridge University Press, 1987), at 149.
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al-Qaeda itself ç a proposition that assumes that armed conflict against an
NSA is possible under international law and that such a conflict triggers the
operation of IHL.6 This is a contested proposition, with at least some scholars
and foreign governments more comfortable with the view that an armed con-
flict may exist in (or might have existed in) Afghanistan or Iraq, by virtue of
the armed conflict between the United States and the Taliban, or between the
United States and Saddam Hussein’s Government. Under this view, either inter-
national law does not countenance the possibility of armed conflict with an
NSA, or if it does, al-Qaeda is not the type of organization that could be a
party to a conflict. A natural extension of this view is that the United States is
only engaged in armed conflict in particular, geographically constrained
areas, as opposed to a global armed conflict with al-Qaeda itself.7 So under
this view, the conflict with al-Qaeda is more like a non-international civil war
confined to a particular country, rather than an international armed conflict
(IAC) that follows the belligerents.
The textual source of this debate is Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, which states that protections enumerated in the provision apply
to conflicts ‘not of an international character’ but which occur ‘in the territory
of a High Contracting Party’.8 The structure of this language is not
self-explanatory, but one view holds that the Geneva Conventions codify the
rule that non-IACs (NIACs) are defined in such a way as to be geographically
contained to the territory of one nation ç anything that extends beyond the
territory of one nation becomes an IAC, so long as it is a conflict between two
states. Conflicts that extend beyond the territory of one state but whose parties
are not state actors fall in the hinterland between these two categories, thus
prompting numerous attempts at creating a new taxonomy of armed conflicts,
including transnational armed conflicts or internationalized armed conflicts.9
These efforts naturally lead to a second set of questions, namely whether to
6 H.H. Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’, Speech before the American
Association of International Law, Washington DC, 25 March 2010. Compare with J.J. Paust,
‘Propriety of Self-Defense Targetings of Members of al Qaeda and Applicable Principles of
Distinction and Proportionality’, 18 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law (2012)
565.
7 See C. Savage, ‘At White House,Weighing Limits of Terror Fight’, NewYork Times, 15 September
2011 (detailing dispute between state and defense department legal advisors).
8 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Art. 3, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea Art. 3, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 3, 12 August 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of POWs, Art. 3, 12 August
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
9 For a discussion, see D. Akande, ‘Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts’, in
E.Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford University Press,
2012).
30 JICJ 11 (2013), 27^45
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import the rules of IAC or NIAC to these conflicts falling into these hybrid
categories.10
However, there is a second potential reading of Common Article 3 and its
reference to the territory of High Contracting Parties. Perhaps signatories
included the language in Common Article 3 not to codify a definition of
non-international conflicts, but rather in furtherance of their desire to use
Common Article 3 to regulate non-international conflicts that occurred on
their territory, while remaining silent as to the rules that would apply outside
their territorial jurisdiction. This is not to suggest that no IHL principles
would apply to such extra-territorial conflicts,11 but rather to deny that the
language in Common Article 3 can be taken as evidence that the drafters of
the Geneva Convention meant to deny the very existence of a legal category
of armed conflicts against NSAs when that violence crosses international
borders.12
With this in mind, what is the underlying principle behind the argument
that the United States cannot be engaged in an armed conflict with an NSA
like al-Qaeda? It cannot be the simple claim that only nation-states are capable
of being a party to an armed conflict. The very existence of NIACs, as a legal
category, indicates that armed conflicts are possible against non-state
entities.13 Rather, the scepticism must stem from the conclusion that al-Qaeda
is not the right type of organization to be a party to an armed conflict.
Is al-Qaeda sufficiently organized and hierarchical? Does it have a command
structure? Is it capable of following the laws of war, as Additional Protocol II
(APII) requires?14 Although these are factual disputes well beyond the purview
of this symposium, several observations are possible.
10 See J.G. Stewart, ‘Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian
Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict’, 850 International Review of the Red Cross
(2003) 313^350.
11 This was, regrettably, the view taken by the Bush Administration, which led the Supreme Court
in Hamdan to rule that Common Article 3 applied to the armed conflict against al-Qaeda be-
cause Common Article 3 was a gap-filling mechanism meant to regulate all conflicts that did
not fall within the definition of international armed conflicts between states. See Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) (‘Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal pro-
tection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with
neither a signatory nor even a non-signatory ‘‘Power’’ who are involved in a conflict ‘‘in the ter-
ritory of’’ a signatory. The latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from the conflict described
in Common Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash between nations (whether sig-
natories or not). In context, then, the phrase ‘‘not of an international character’’ bears its literal
meaning.’).
12 See Hamdan, ibid., at 630 (citing ICRC Commentary for the proposition that ‘the scope of appli-
cation of the Article must be as wide as possible’).
13 See Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Tadic¤ (IT-95-1-A),
Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995 (‘Tadic¤ Interlocutory Appeal Decision’), x 70; Judgment,
Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998, x 620. For a discussion, see A.
Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 123.
14 See Art.1, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977.
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First, a distinction ought to be made between organizations with a command
hierarchy and organizations with a linear hierarchy. Although IHL arguably
requires the former, there is nothing in codified IHL that requires the latter.15
Command structures can take many different geometric forms and nothing in
Geneva, API or APII requires the existence of a linear command structure
analogous to the linear command structure of a traditional state army.
Secondly, what matters is the existence of a functional command structure
embodied in Article 1 of APII; a hierarchy of individuals who give and take
orders and carry out violent operations in accordance with that command
structure. Why would it matter whether that structure looks like the same
structure of the US or German Army or the NATO High Command? Thirdly,
what matters is whether the organization is sufficiently organized that it
could follow the laws of war if it was so inclined. As it happens, there is some
evidence that al-Qaeda is capable of following the laws of war but has emphat-
ically decided against it, in accordance with matters of strategy and its
Weltanschaaung of a global jihad against supposed Western imperialism and
unchecked secularism.
3. TheWar between IHL and IHRL
Just as the existence of an armed conflict ç the subject of the previous section
ç structures the entire legal analysis, so too does the deeply contentious
relationship between IHL and IHRL. Adding venom to the dispute is the fact
that each body of law has its own legal institutions and its own dedicated
personnel ç human rights lawyers versus military lawyers ç each with
their own doctrinal allegiances. Human rights lawyers are trained to believe
in the universality of human rights law, while most military lawyers are condi-
tioned to protect the centrality and exclusivity of IHL ç to, in the words of
Yoram Dinstein, keep poachers off the grass.16
Again, American drone strikes have brought to the foreground two different
paradigms that each expresses a different and competing relationship between
IHL and IHRL. Under the first view, IHL is lex specialis to the more general
human rights law; the specific licence and regulations of IHL (i.e. the privilege
of combatant immunity and the demands of the principle of distinction) are
triggered during armed conflict, thus displacing the more stringent protections
of human rights law, including the right to life.17 This is not to suggest that
human rights are no longer universal. Rather, it is to suggest that the
15 For a contrary view, see K. Ambos and J. Alkatout,‘Has ‘‘Justice Been Done’’? The Legality of Bin
Laden’s Killing under International Law’, 45 Israel Law Review (2012) 341, at 347.
16 Y. Dinstein, ‘Concluding Remarks: LOAC and the Attempts to Abuse or Subvert It’, 87
International Studies (2011) 483, at 488. For discussion of this view, see D. Luban, ‘Military
Lawyers and the Two Cultures Problem’, Leiden Journal of International Law (forthcoming, 2013).
17 On the difficulty of combining the regimes, see W. Schabas, ‘Lex Specialis? Belts and
Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict,
and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum’, 40 Israel Law Review (2007) 592.
32 JICJ 11 (2013), 27^45
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lex specialis of IHL provides the specific codification of what human rights law
demands in times of armed conflict, as the International Court of Justice has
expressed.18 The more general codification of human rights is simply inappro-
priate in times of armed conflict, requiring a different balancing of the appro-
priate protections in order to achieve the maximum humanization of conflict
as possible. In this sense, it might be more appropriate to refer to IHL as
‘Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict’.
However, a recent view has gained currency that suggests that drone strikes
are governed directly by IHRL even if the protections of IHL apply, that the
two bodies of law can be ‘co-applied’ at the same time, thus denying that IHL’s
status as lex specialis means that it knocks out the general law from
operation.19 Indeed, at least some scholars have suggested that lex specialis is
‘latinized nonsense’ that stands in as a promissory note for an argument that
is never redeemed.20 At the very least, it is certainly true that the term is
deeply engrained in the Continental literature but historically absent from the
American lexicon. Evaluating the co-application thesis requires a consider-
ation of the underlying aims of each body of law and their compatibility with
each other, rather than recourse to conclusory terminology whether Latin or
not.
The real risk of the co-application thesis is that it involves, from the perspec-
tive of the human rights lawyer, a deal with the devil. In order to render IHRL
applicable during times of armed conflict, the relevant provisions must be
interpreted (or re-interpreted) to square them with the undeniable realities of
IHL, especially the privilege of unfettered combatancy and the right to detain
enemy combatants as prisoners of war (POWs) without trial or conviction.
Simply put, IHL permits the taking of human life ç often in large numbers
ç in the course of securing a military objective. Neither of these principles is
consistent with peacetime human rights; perhaps reinterpreting IHRL to take
into account these realities is to succumb far too much to the blood and guts
that military lawyers have come to expect from lawful armed conflict.21
The co-application thesis is especially relevant when considering the
summary killing performed by a Predator drone. Are such attacks only permis-
sible when capture and trial are impossible, as the Israeli Targeted Killings
decision suggested?22 Or is lethal force permissible whenever the target is
lawfully selected, regardless of whether capture is feasible? On one level of
the analysis, the alleged duty to capture is rendered more plausible if
18 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ
Reports, at 226, x 25.
19 See M. Milanovic,‘Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’, in
O. Ben-Naftali (ed.), Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (Oxford University
Press, 2010).
20 See J.J. Paust, ‘Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of
Drones in Pakistan’, 19 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy (2009) 237, at 247 note 94.
21 This anxiety is addressed by Milanovic, supra note 19.
22 HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr.53(4) PD 459 [2005] (hereafter cited
as Targeted Killings decision).
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IHRL is co-applied with IHL; the duty to capture might stem from the import-
ation of IHRL principles of necessity. However, the dilemma clearly predates
the importation of IHRL norms into the debate of targeted killings.23 Even
within the field of IHL, there is substantial debate over the summary nature
of the privilege of combatancy, and whether the principle of military necessity
allows for summary killing of combatants or only allows such killing when
capture is implausible.24 This debate arguably predates the Israeli Targeted
Killings decision and certainly predates the development of Predator drones
by several years.
Turning now to the application of IHRL to these attacks, the United States
has long been sceptical of the extraterritorial application of human rights
obligations, preferring instead to view IHRL obligations as limited to the sover-
eign territory of the signatory. This view is buttressed by the opening language
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
states in Article 2 that each state party ‘undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant :::’.25 If one were to take this statement
literally,26 it would mean that nothing in the ICCPR would apply to targeted
killings committed in areas outside of the sovereign territory of the United
States. Although one might appeal to areas of ‘de facto’ control or sovereignty,
such as Guanta¤ namo Bay,27 there is no serious argument that the United
States has either control or sovereignty over areas in Yemen or the tribal re-
gions of Pakistan where drone strikes are launched.28 Applying IHRL in such
areas thus necessitates an argument that IHRL applies extraterritorially.
The United States has softened its stance slightly regarding co-application,
but only slightly. In its most recent filing before the Human Rights
23 For a full discussion of this issue, see J.D. Ohlin, ‘The Duty to Capture’, 97 Minnesota Law Review
(forthcoming), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract¼2131720 (visited 7 December 2012).
24 For the historical view that IHL permits killing enemy combatants only if capture is not feas-
ible, see J. Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (1985), at 75,
cited in ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law, adopted by the ICRC Assembly on 26 February 2009, at 82 n.
221.
25 ICCPR, opened for signature 19 December 1966, Art. 6(5), S. EXEC. DOC. 36 E, 95-2, at 23 (1978),
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (emphasis added).
26 Milanovic argues that the ‘and’ between the words ‘respect’and ‘ensure’ in Art. 2 is textual am-
biguous, and concludes on the basis of context and history that the ICCPR requires that state
signatories respect ICCPR rights everywhere, but ensure them only within their territory. See
M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties Law, Principles, and Policy
(Oxford University Press, 2011).
27 The notion of ‘de facto control’ provided the basis for the US Supreme Court to exercise constitu-
tional review over detention in Guanta¤ namo Bay in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229
(2008), at 2240. See A.J. Colangelo, ‘‘‘De Facto Sovereignty’’: Boumediene and Beyond’, 77
GeorgeWashington Law Review (2009) 623.
28 For a discussion, see C.I. Keitner, ‘Rights Beyond Borders’, 36 Yale Journal of International Law
(2011) 55, at 64 (discussing ‘compact’ and ‘conscience’ models of constitutional rights that
would apply extra-territorially to governmental conduct inYemen).
34 JICJ 11 (2013), 27^45
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Committee, the United States conceded that ‘[w]ith respect to the application of
the Covenant and the international law of armed conflict (also referred to as
international humanitarian law or ‘‘IHL’’), the United States has not taken the
position that the Covenant does not apply ‘‘in time of war.’’’29 At first glance,
this statement sounds as if it supports the co-application view. However, that
conclusion might be too hasty, since the US position statement continued:
‘Indeed, a time of war does not suspend the operation of the Covenant to mat-
ters within its scope of application’ (emphasis added). The question is what
matters are within the scope of the Covenant’s application, as opposed to
within the scope of IHL. The position statement continued with this illustrative
example: ‘To cite but two obvious examples :::, a State Party’s participation in a
war would in no way excuse it from respecting and ensuring rights to have or
adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice or the right and opportunity of every
citizen to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections.’30 Obviously,
neither of these protections have much to do with the core principles of IHL
regarding detention or targeting.
This suggests a final view regarding co-application that is highly relevant for
its application to drone strikes. Some argue that IHL’s status as a lex specialis
means that it applies when it offers a direct rule on point, but otherwise
IHRL, whether from the Covenant or another source, represents a gap-filler
that plugs the holes left by IHL’s porous nature.31 In application, such debates
will always hinge on a critical evaluation of whether there is ç or is not ç a
hole in IHL that needs to be filled. In that regard, it might be helpful to distin-
guish between a strong and weak form of the gap-filling thesis. Under the
strong form, IHRL fills any gaps left over when no codified rule of IHL is on
point. Under the weaker form, IHRL only fills any gaps remaining when no
customary rule of IHL governs. The weaker form, therefore, depends on deeply
contested arguments regarding the exact scope of customary norms of IHL,
though recent International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) projects have
increased the level of systematization and reporting of customary norms in
this area.32 As applied to targeted killings, this gap-filling version of the
co-application thesis is particularly relevant with regard to the rules applicable
in NIACs which are codified only in Common Article 3 and APII, arguably
leaving substantial gaps in which IHRL might be applied. However, if one
argues that IAC norms apply by virtue of custom in NIAC, then the available
space for IHRL to ‘fill the gap’ is substantially reduced.
It should also be noted that international prosecutors, on the one side, and
human rights lawyers, on the other, might have opposite and competing
29 U.S. Department of State, Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United
Nations Committee on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 30 December 2011, x506.
30 Ibid.
31 See e.g.Y. Shany and O. Ben-Naftali, ‘Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories’, 37 Israel Law Review (2003^2004) 17, at 88.
32 See J.M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law:Volume 1:
Rules (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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interests in this legal battle. Ever since the Tadic¤ decision at the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), prosecutors and judges
have been arguing that legal norms have already been expanded from IAC to
NIAC, thereby establishing the necessary predicate violation of IHL to trigger
a war crimes conviction.33 From the perspective of international criminal
lawyers, if there is no violation of IHL, then by definition there can be no war
crime, thus creating a built-in institutional bias in favour of IHL expansion.
On the other hand, human rights lawyers often have the opposite interest.
They seek to cabin IHL to its lowest possible ebb, thus increasing the space
available for IHRL to fill the gap. That is because human rights lawyers are
less concerned with prosecuting individuals for past conduct and more
concerned with chastening future conduct such as American prosecution of
the armed conflict with al-Qaeda.
As a final point, it is impossible to determine the application of IHL and
IHRL without first taking a position on the legal geography of armed conflict,
i.e. whether IHL follows the parties to the conflict, applies only in the state
where the conflict occurs, or perhaps only on the so-called hot battlefield ç
the area of most intense fighting. Writing in this volume, Noam Lubell and
Nathan Derejko reject both the widest and narrowest application of IHL to
either the entire state in which the hostilities occur or the overly narrow
battlefield where the hostilities are presently occurring.34 The key provisions
for Lubell and Derejko are the requirements that the terrorist be directly parti-
cipating in hostilities. Moreover, the authors conclude that although a drone
strike may not necessarily trigger the application of IHL, at some point a suffi-
ciently large number of drone strikes may itself trigger the application of IHL
in the area where the drones are deployed. Although this type of self-triggering
of IHL may be disturbing to some, the authors persuasively conclude that
drone strikes are equally bound by the requirements of jus ad bellum, which
may very well impose constraints upon, or even outright prohibit, the particu-
lar territorial incursion.35
4. Targeting Civilians
Assuming arguendo that the law of war applies to US drone attacks, there is an
open question of who can be targeted under IHL? Are members of al-Qaeda or
so-called ‘affiliated forces’ protected civilians or bona fide combatants subject
to the reciprocal risk of killing? (Or perhaps terrorists are subject to an
asymmetrical risk of killing, whereby their status as unprivileged combatants
33 Tadic¤ Interlocutory Appeal Decision, xx 128^137. See also C. Greenwood, ‘International
Humanitarian Law and the Tadic¤ Case’, 7 European Journal of International Law (1996) 265, at
280.
34 See N. Lubell and N. Derejko,‘A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed
Conflict’, in this symposium.
35 Ibid.
36 JICJ 11 (2013), 27^45
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allows them to be killed but their status does not confer on them privileged
combatancy.) The warrant for denying them combatant immunity, as historic-
ally asserted by the Bush Administration, is that governments involved in
NIAC have historically maintained the right under international law to treat
members of a rebellion as enemies of the state subject to criminal prosecu-
tion.36 Although Lincoln conferred belligerent status on Confederate soldiers
during the Civil War, this was allegedly an optional declaration not required
by international law.37 The question, though, is whether a government can
have it both ways: recognize the existence of an armed conflict with an NSA,
yet also deny its members the privilege of combatancy. Does this asymmetry
conflate two separate paradigms: law enforcement and armed conflict? Either
the enemy is an enemy of the state or it is capable of being afforded the privil-
ege of combatancy if it complies with the basic requirements of the laws of
war.38
As to the status of alleged terrorists, they are clearly targetable under
black-letter IHL so long as they are directly participating in hostilities.
International lawyers have long been perplexed with how to apply this mercur-
ial standard, and the ICRC waded into the water when it published its contro-
versial Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities, a document
whose drafting was so contentious that it prompted vicious dissents from all
sides.39 Of particular note was its suggestion that civilians could be targeted
at any time if they exercised a ‘continuous combat function’ in the military
organization of an NSA. The rationale for this new category ç arguably
lex ferenda ç was to resolve what many considered an intolerable asymmetry
in the law of war.40 While regular combatants of a state army could be targeted
at any time by virtue of their status, civilian fighters of a non-state military
force could only be targeted at the moment when they were directly participat-
ing in hostilities. To some, this asymmetry tipped the rules of IHL towards
NSAs and against traditional state militaries.41 Once the continuous combat
36 In this respect, see R.R. Baxter, ‘So-Called ‘‘Unprivileged Belligerency’’: Spies, Guerrillas, and
Saboteurs’, 28 BritishYear Book of International Law (1951) 323.
37 S.C. Neff, Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil War (Harvard University Press,
2010).
38 Critically, see G.D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 207.
39 For a polemical description of that process, see W.H. Park, ‘Part IX of the ICRC ‘‘Direct
Participation in Hostilities’’ Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect’, 42 N.Y.U.
Journal of International Law and Politics (2010) 769, at 805.
40 See ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 24, at
33.
41 See e.g. K. Watkin, ‘Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC ‘‘Direct
Participation in Hostilities’’ Interpretive Guidance’, 42 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and
Politics (2010) 641, at 689 (‘Combined with a narrow concept of membership in an organized
armed group and a correspondingly broad notion of who is a civilian, the protection normally
associated with uninvolved civilians begins to look like a form of immunity for insurgents. It
is a protection which is consciously not provided to State security forces.’).
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function standard is applied, though, non-state fighters and traditional army
soldiers are placed on a level playing field.
Applying the continuous combat function is anything but simple. The US
government believes that all members of al-Qaeda and associated forces are
ipso facto exercising a continuous combat function, which makes them target-
able any moment by virtue of their status. This claim depends for its veracity
on the nature of the terrorist organization in question. If the organization is
purely military in nature then there is at least a colourable argument that all
members exercise a continuous combat function, in the same sense that all
members of a regular army, even if working as a cook, exercise a continuous
combat function because they received basic training and are capable of
firing a rifle (and indeed expected to) if the situation demands it.42 Under this
approach, membership alone in the military organization (whether a state or
non-state group) would form the basis for targeting. That being the case,
criteria for membership must change depending on the nature of the organiza-
tion. Membership in the regular armed forces can be determined by formal
criteria alone, such as the wearing of a military uniform and employment by
the armed forces. In contrast, membership in a non-state military group (if it
is to be a workable standard) must be determined by functional criteria such
as the giving and taking of orders and one’s participation in a hierarchical
chain of command.43
The question is whether al-Qaeda, or any of its regional affiliates, are indeed
exclusively military organizations in this fashion, or whether they are mixed
civilian/military organizations that engage in civilian functions such as local
governance, providing social services to local populations, such as health care
and schooling.While it may be the case that al-Qaeda core was an exclusively
military organization, what is one to make of Al-Shabaab in Somalia, a local
Islamic insurgency with control over specific territory and a stated goal of
expanding its territory? Whether this rises to the level of a mixed civilian^mili-
tary organization is a question of fact and may even change over time.
Several scholars have suggested that IHL, in both academic theory and state
practice, is moving from primarily status-based targeting towards an increased
reliance on (and demand for) conduct-based targeting.44 The increased import-
ance of the ‘directly participating in hostilities’ standard is just one piece of
evidence that conduct has become more important than status in targeting
decisions. The United States now engages in so-called signature strikes, which
42 See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.Supp.2d 63, 73^74 (D.D.C. 2009), citing APII, Art. 13. See also
Judgment, Galic¤ (IT-98-29-T), Trial Chamber, 5 December 2003, x 47, and Judgment, Blas› kic¤
(IT-95-14-T),Trial Chamber, 3 March 2000, x180.
43 As an example, see Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), at 872^873. See also N.
Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2008), at 350^352; J.D.
Ohlin, ‘Targeting Co-Belligerents’, in Finkelstein, Ohlin and Altman (eds), supra note 3, 60^89,
at 86^87.
44 See S. Issacharoff and R.H. Pildes, ‘Targeted Warfare: Individuating Enemy Responsibility’
(forthcoming), available online at http://ssrn.com/abstract¼2129860 (visited 7 December 2012).
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are analysed by Kevin Heller in this volume.45 According to Heller, while some
of the signatures used by the United States result in attacks that are legally
valid under IHL, others are per se illegal under international law because the
signature may be over-inclusive and pick out targets that are neither directly
participating in hostilities nor exercising a continuous combat function.
According to Larry May, the shift to conduct-based targeting is reason
enough to trigger a due process analysis that requires some judicial consider-
ation, unless there is absolute exigency, of the factual basis for the conduct-
based targeting decision.46 These intuitions are widely shared, though there is
something disconcerting about the result that due process concerns are only
triggered when the state engages in a careful surgical strike, but that these
concerns evaporate when the state selects the more cavalier method of aerial
bombardment of an entire military installation, potentially killing many more
individuals. There is something ironic about requiring greater legal scrutiny
of targeting when the state kills a single individual than when the state kills a
larger number of individuals. While it is true that the killing of a larger
number of individuals looks like war, and the killing of a single individual
looks like an extra-judicial execution, perhaps this realization sets up a per-
verse incentive to kill more, rather than fewer, individuals. Nonetheless, May
is absolutely correct that the naming of a single-individual prima facie suggests,
even if it does not conclusively demonstrate, the triggering of a law-
enforcement model.
As for the future, the development of the ‘continuous combat function’stand-
ard could suggest a return to the primacy of status-based targeting. For some
human rights lawyers this is a disconcerting development. However, the
relative merits of status-based and conduct-based targeting are difficult to
evaluate. The law of armed conflict is built around status-based determinations
and does not have the institutional structures to carefully oversee decisions
regarding conduct-based targeting. The whole point of IHL is that the partici-
pants themselves must enforce the prohibitions in the here and now; the sanc-
tions imposed by international criminal tribunals for violations of targeting
protocol are ex post and are only designed to end impunity. It is unrealistic to
expect that criminal courts applying conduct-based criteria will oversee and
achieve real-time compliance with substantive provisions of the law they are
applying. It is precisely for this reason that IHL has always favoured legal
prohibitions that place transparency and publicity at their core.
5. Civilian Employees as Belligerents
This naturally leads to one of the most specific problems with the drone
campaign from the perspective of ICL. Although many of the drone pilots are
45 See K.J. Heller, ‘‘‘One Hell of a Killing Machine’’: Signature Strikes and International Law’, in this
symposium.
46 See L. May, ‘Targeted Killings and Proportionality in Law andWar’, in this symposium.
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uniformed members of the military operating under the Joint Special
Operations Command (JSOC), many others are reportedly non-uniformed
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel. Although CIA and military
personnel are both operating drones from a great distance, neither of which
can be seen by the targets, the formal criteria for the privilege of belligerency
plays out differently for them. A military member operating under JSOC is
wearing a fixed emblem recognizable at a distance, is part of the regular
armed forces, and is therefore unquestionably entitled to combatant immunity.
On the other hand, CIA personnel are not members of the regular military
and do not meet the Geneva Convention criteria for the privilege. Does this
fact make their actions criminal? Have they committed a war crime? What
implication, if any, does this have for the superiors to oversee their conduct? If
the drone operators have violated criminal law and have no combatant immun-
ity conferred by international law, then the individuals who ordered the
attacks are also guilty as accomplices or even indirect perpetrators. Under
this strain of thought, is President Barack Obama a serial murderer, respon-
sible for dozens of drone killings, as journalist BenWittes once asked (rhetoric-
ally and facetiously)?47 To some, this might constitute a reductio ad absurdum
of the argument, suggesting that at least one of the premises in the argument
must be false. But which one?
Answering this question requires a sensitive analysis of the privilege of com-
batancy and what implications flow from its violation. In the past, the US
government has prosecuted members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban for the
crime of ‘murder in violation of the laws of war’.48 Critics have rightly sug-
gested that these crimes amount to nothing more than criminalizing unprivil-
eged combatancy, because the sole source of the alleged violation is the
actor’s lack of privileged combatancy. The question is whether unprivileged
combatancy is a criminal violation of the laws of war.49 It clearly offends the
scheme of combatant immunity, but what conclusion can one draw from the
lack of any available immunity to a combatant? There is nothing in the Rome
Statute, or any other international criminal statute, that refers to the war
crime of ‘murder in violation of the laws of war’.
Although murder is not a war crime per se, it certainly is a domestic crime
in every jurisdiction. Without the immunity conferred by the international
law of war, the domestic criminal law applies with full force, and combatants
are therefore subject to the full force of its sanctions. The US government
initially resisted this argument because US military commissions had
47 The incident is recounted in K. Delanian, ‘In Legal Battle against Drone Strikes, She’s on the
Front Lines’, Los Angeles Times, 9 October 2012 (describing debate between Mary Ellen
O’Connell and BenWittes).
48 See J.C. Dehn, ‘The Hamdan Case and the Application of a Municipal Offence: The Common Law
Origins of ‘Murder in Violation of the Law of War’, 7 Journal of International Criminal Justice
(JICJ) (2009) 63 (evaluating prospects of justifying prosecution of unprivileged belligerency as
a domestic crime historically prosecuted by military commission).
49 See Baxter, supra note 36, at 333^338 (concluding that unprivileged guerrillas violate domestic
law because no rule of international law confers immunity on their actions).
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jurisdictions over violations of the international law of war; a domestic
criminal law violation arguably fell outside the scope of the commission
process and required a civilian prosecution in a regular Article III criminal
court.
In applying this standard to CIA personnel operating drones, it sug-
gests that they have not committed an international war crime by virtue of
their unprivileged acts of killing, though they might be guilty of violating
the domestic criminal law of Yemen, Pakistan or Somalia. Apparently the
prospect of criminal prosecution and extradition to such countries is so
extremely remote as to not chasten the government’s conduct, though the
in absentia conviction of CIA agents in Italy for an extraordinary rendi-
tion ought to provide a cautionary lesson regarding overconfidence in this
regard.50
Recently, the US government has asserted a middle ground position regard-
ing the nature of the criminal prohibition in question. In proceedings before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the government argued that
military commissions have jurisdiction to try violations of the US common
law of war, such as providing material support to terrorism.51 According to
the government, the US common law of war is distinct from the international
law of war, and represents unwritten precedent stemming from military
commissions past, notably those convened during the Civil War.52 If
American military commissions have historically prosecuted certain offences,
these offences are part of a domestic common law of war, even if the offences
are not criminalized by the international law of war. Presumably, this theory
could apply to murder in violation of the law of nations as well, thus
making unprivileged combatancy a crime under the American law of war
(but not IHL).
This argument was rejected by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
which overturned Salim Hamdan’s conviction for material support even
though he had been released from custody six years prior.53 Citing the US
government’s own brief to the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Quirin, the D.C.
Circuit concluded that the relevant body of law for prosecuting law of war
violations is the international law of war.54 Indeed, there is something odd
about each state developing its own municipal law of war and prosecuting
enemy fighters on this basis. This argument, if taken to its logical conclusion,
would see CIA personnel standing trial before military courts in enemy
countries for violating the municipal laws of war as developed by those
50 For a discussion of the case, see F. Messineo, ‘‘‘Extraordinary Renditions’’ and State Obligations
to Criminalize and Prosecute Torture in the Light of the Abu Omar Case in Italy’, 7 JICJ (2009)
1023. See an edited English version of the trial judgment in Cassese et al. (eds), International
Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2010), at 564.
51 Brief for the United States, Hamdan v. United States, USCA Case 11-1257, Doc. 1353008, 17
January 2012.
52 Ibid.
53 Hamdan v. United States, 2012 WL 4874564 (D.C. Circuit), 16 October 2012.
54 Ibid., at 10, citing Brief for the United States at 29, Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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countries. The whole point of the law of war is that it represents a common
body of law that binds both sides of an armed conflict.
Essentially, CIA personnel are irregular members of the US armed
forces. Since they neither display distinctive signs recognizable at a distance
nor carry their arms openly, they are not entitled to IHL’s privilege of
combatancy and ‘post-capture’-POW status.55 Although one could argue that
the drones themselves constitute ‘arms carried openly’, the more serious
problem is that the use of force carried out by the CIA is legally covert
and unacknowledged and therefore not, in the collective sense, an open display
of force. Although the involvement of CIA officers in targeted killings
might be justified by human rights law or domestic criminal law, perhaps
even as an extraterritorial application of US domestic law enforcement
power, this avenue would trigger additional doctrinal requirements. Human
rights law generally requires exigency and necessity ç requirements that
might require a duty to attempt capture or a determination that capture is
not feasible.56
If CIA personnel operating remotely piloted drones are unprivileged combat-
ants who violate domestic criminal law in the country within which they
operate, are they also subject to attack themselves by virtue of their direct par-
ticipation in hostilities? It would appear so, in so far as they meet the AP stand-
ard for direct participation. The more pressing question is whether CIA
personnel are permanently targetable by virtue of their status, potentially
under a reverse ‘continuous combat function’ argument. If a CIA operative is
exercising this function for the US government, can he or she be killed at any
moment in time, similar to an al-Qaeda operative? The underlying theory
might suggest yes, although the CCF standard only applies to non-state
military forces. Furthermore, even if CIA personnel are targetable, they are
only targetable by bona fide enemy combatants who themselves enjoy the
privilege of combatancy ç not al-Qaeda operatives who do not enjoy combat-
ant immunity by virtue of their failure to comply with the laws and customs
of war.
6. Proportionality
One of the most common complaints about American drone strikes is that they
cause significant civilian casualties.57 To the extent that the causalities are
excessive, they would violate IHL and perhaps even Article 8(2)(b) of the
Rome Statute if they are ‘clearly’ excessive. But how is this calculation to be
55 ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, supra note 24, at 22.
56 See Ohlin, ‘The Duty to Capture’, supra note 23 (noting the different requirements of military
necessity under IHL and necessity under IHRL). See also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985);
Eric Holder, Speech at Northwestern University School of Law, 5 March 2012 (stating that US
government only uses lethal force against US citizens abroad if capture is not feasible).
57 See O’Connell, supra note 1.
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made? How many civilians must be killed before we determine that the strike
violated international law? Like all standards (as opposed to more precise
rules), the student of the law makes that determination by reading the applic-
able decisions by courts that have applied the standard. This research inevit-
ably leads to an analysis that courts have declared strikes illegal under x and
y circumstances, and to the extent that a hypothetical strike is analogous to x
and y, it too would be deemed illegal. However, such precedents are non-exist-
ent because the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC rarely convicted anyone for vio-
lating the principle of proportionality. Since there are no decisions, the exact
scope of the legal rule remains frustratingly indeterminate.
Why is this the case? Proportionality in targeting is notoriously difficult to
apply in reality. First, the standard requires judging the scenario from the
perspective of the commander and the information available at her disposal.58
Secondly, the standard requires balancing the number of anticipated civilian
deaths with the value of the military objective. But how is the value of the mili-
tary objective to be translated into a precise number? Although philosophers
and just war theorists have debated this question, there is almost no case law
on the question. Also, some theorists question whether one can judge the
value of the individual military target independent of the value of the overall
war effort, potentially collapsing the distinction between jus in bello and jus ad
bellum.59 Thirdly, and most importantly, international courts have largely
escaped the demands of proportionality analysis by hanging all of their efforts
on the concept of distinction. Situations that are normally understood by
common law lawyers to involve reckless collateral damage to civilians would
be redefined in the jurisprudence of the ICTY to involve intentional or indis-
criminate attacking of civilians. How is this feat accomplished? Simply because
continental lawyers view dolus eventualis, the civil law analogue that most
closely resembles recklessness, as a sub-category of intent, and therefore a
mental state capable of triggering the categorical prohibition against directly
attacking civilian targets. In practice, lawyers trained in the civil law tradition
would assess whether somebody targeting a military objective had accepted
the risk that, in the ordinary course of events, hitting the military target
would have resulted, for instance, in a high number of civilian casualties.
A judge reaching this conclusion would be warranted to conclude that the
attack was illegal, for example because the attacker had intentionally targeted
civilians (if no military target was actually present)60 or had fired indiscrimin-
ately (if the amount of civilian casualties vastly exceeded the expected military
advantage or an indiscriminate weapon has been used).61
58 See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000), x 50 (discussing
‘reasonable military commander’ standard).
59 See T. Jurka, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’, 33 Philosophy & Public Affairs (2005) 34, at
44.
60 See e.g. Galic¤ Trial Judgment, xx 438^496 (Markale market incident).
61 See e.g. Galic¤ Trial Judgment, xx 372^387; Judgment, Martic¤ (IT-95-11-A), Appeals Chamber, 8
December 2008, xx 247^252.
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As applied to drone strikes, these issues are highly relevant. Debates sur-
rounding drone strikes that cause civilian casualties often degenerate into
pointless competitions of untestable ‘intuitions’ that the reported civilian
deaths are proportionate, disproportionate or clearly excessive. The balancing
tests implicit in these arguments very rarely change anyone’s mind, since
there is no case law to appeal to as a neutral arbiter in these debates. This
radical legal indeterminacy does not indicate a moral indeterminacy, of
course, but it does limit the capacity for progress in the legal discourse, frus-
trating the ability of the field to move forward. Moreover, the subject-matter is
beset with cross-talking. Both common law-trained lawyers and military law-
yers are inclined to adopt a very restrictive understanding of the notion of in-
tentionally attacking civilians, while civil law-trained lawyers are more
inclined to take such a broad reading of the prohibition against directly attack-
ing civilians that some of the reported drone strikes might violate the per se
prohibition against attacking civilians. In a sense, both views might be correct
relative to their paradigm’s understanding of the concept of intent.
7. Conclusion
The preceding summary suggests that although the US deployment of drone
strikes raises deep and potentially intractable dilemma for IHL, these are by
no means new issues for the field to address. The field has long struggled with
how to regard NSAs and how to categorize armed conflicts between
them and traditional states. The scholarly dialogue regarding the interplay be-
tween IHL and IHRL has undergone substantial evolution in the last decade,
although whether this movement was sparked by the drone campaign is
doubtful; rather, it is more likely the inevitable collision of competing
paradigms or what David Luban has referred to as the ‘Two Cultures
Problem’.62
The drone campaign has added urgency to the legal status of targeted terror-
ists, although the standard of civilians ‘directly participating in hostilities’
long pre-dates the armed conflict against al-Qaeda. Critics of the ‘continuous
combat function’ legal standard developed by the ICRC have suggested that it
is an unfortunate and misguided attempt to legitimate how the United States
and its allies target terrorists. However, regardless of the motivation, the ques-
tion is whether the definition is legally defensible, not whether it was inspired
by a specific factual scenario. As for the status of civilian employees in warfare,
and whether they violate the laws of war when they operate remotely piloted
drones, this is merely the flipside of the status question for terrorists. Once
IHL is liberated from jus ad bellum, legal standards for civilian/combatant
status must be determined by virtue of a neutral principle for both sides of
62 See Luban, supra note 16.
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the conflict.63 If al-Qaeda operatives do not enjoy combatant immunity for
failure to carry arms openly and display a fixed emblem recognizable at a
distance, neither do US personnel operating covertly. One thing is certain:
legal analysis regarding proportionality remains hamstrung by the lack of
impartial factual reporting of civilian casualties ç a lacuna that has plagued
prior armed conflicts as well. This is one area where the ex post fact-finding
machinery of international criminal justice may have some role to play.
63 Cf. J. Waldron, ‘Justifying Targeted Killing with a Neutral Principle?’ in Finkelstein, Ohlin and
Altman (eds), supra note 3, 112.
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